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An Agency Perspective of 
Auditor Change in Small Firms
Kevin Keasey 
Robert Watson
This paper uses an agency theory perspective to develop an understanding of 
the determinants of auditor change for small firms in the United Kingdom. The 
paper, therefore, extends the existing literature (see Williams [22] and Francis 
and Wilson [9]) from a consideration of auditor change for large firms in the 
United States to small firms in the U.K. The results indicate that small U.K. firms 
have a greater propensity to change their auditors subsequent to the receipt of 
a first-time audit qualification, to a change in the composition of their board 
of directors, to a change in their use of external loan capital, and when their 
existing loans are not secured. The results indicate some support for the agency 
arguments examined, though there is also evidence of auditor ‘accommodation’ 
being sought.
INTRODUCTION
The recent growth in the phenomenon of auditor change has raised fears 
concerning the independence of auditors. It is sometimes suspected that the 
decision to change auditors is the consequence of firms shopping around’ 
for more accommodating monitors, that is, auditors who are more willing 
to agree to clients’ wishes. Fears such as these seem to lie behind recent 
attempts, such as the U.K. government’s proposed implementation of the 
EC’s Eighth Company Law Directive (DTI [7]), to make it more difficult 
and costly for firms to dismiss their auditors and to limit the extent of 
economic dependence of auditors on individual clients.
Nevertheless, the desire of firms to seek accommodating auditors is 
unlikely to provide the only, or even the most important, reason for changing 
auditors. Other reasons for change may include a need for a more specialized, 
better quality or cheaper audit service, or be due to a change in the contracting 
environment (i.e., the arrival of a new management team/chief executive, 
a rapid change in either the size or nature of the client’s operations).
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The available empirical evidence seems to bear this out. A number of 
empirical studies (i.e., Chow and Rice [4], De Angelo [6 ], Schwartz and 
Menon [19], Crasswell [5], W illiams [22], Francis and W ilson [9]) have found 
an association between changes in  auditors and such factors as
(i) changes in  corporate management,
(ii) the receipt of a qualified audit report,
(iii) the extent of non-audit services provided,
(iv) the industry specialization of the audit firm,
(v) the financial condition of the client company,
(vi) changes in share bonus schemes, and
(vii) changes in the diffusion of share ownership.
However, the existing research on auditor change has been exclusively 
concerned w ith  the large, p u b lic ly -q u oted , com pany sector. T his  
concentration on large firms is somewhat surprising given that there are 
arguments that suggest auditor changes m ight be more frequent w ithin the 
small firm sector. For instance, many of the costs associated w ith changing 
auditors, particularly search and setup costs, are likely to be relatively lower 
for small firms than for large firms. Nevertheless, it may be that for very small 
firms the opportunity costs of the owner’s time in  searching for a new auditor 
may be very expensive. Auditor independence may also be more of a problem  
within this sector because of the lack of regular public scrutiny by capital 
market interests. As Moizer [16] has noted, both listed com panies and their 
auditors have a strong econom ic interest in  m aintaining independence;
Auditors who are perceived to be more independent and hence more likely to report 
a breach by management, will be valued more highly by the capital market. The greater 
the reputation enjoyed by auditors, then the greater will be the increase in market value 
of the companies audited by them and hence the greater will be the fees that they can 
command for audit services (p. 36).
However, many important features of the small firm sector, such as a 
lack of separation of ownership from control, the m uch less stringent 
financial reporting and other regulatory requirements and the very wide 
variety of audit firms that are able to audit their accounts, reduce the 
applicability of this line of reasoning. Thus, much of the large firm research 
findings w ill be of lim ited relevance to this sector. T his paper, however, 
utilizes the large firm agency-based models of W illiams [22] and Francis and 
W ilson [9] to guide the empirical analysis of auditor change in  the U.K. small 
firm sector.
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T he paper is organized into four sections. T he first section develops a 
general m odel of auditor change for small firms. T he second section describes 
the data set, the model, the variables and the empirical methods. The third 
section presents the empirical findings and the final section discusses the 
results in the light of the existing literature.
AGENCY PERSPECTIVES AND  
A U D ITO R  CHANGE IN SMALL FIRMS
T his section briefly describes W illiam s’ and Francis and W ilson’s models 
of auditor change. T he models are then developed to take into account 
differences in  the OM^nership structure, regulatory and other environmental 
features so as to make them applicable to small firms in the U.K. W illiam s’ 
model of auditor change is derived from an agency setting characterized by 
uncertainty, inform ation asymmetries and conflicting interests between 
managers (agents) and shareholders (principals) and other contracting 
entities. In this setting, the possibility of both ex ante (adverse selection) and 
ex post (moral hazard) opportunism  exists (see Jensen and Meckling [11]). 
From this perspective, the demand for auditing is motivated by the need for 
reliable and accurate financial information to reduce the manager’s superior 
inform ation position. T his has provided a rationale for the “traditional” 
stewardship function of auditing. By providing the means whereby the 
performance of managers can be monitored, the moral hazard problem can 
be largely ameliorated by the appointm ent of independent external auditors. 
A similar agency perspective is adopted in the Francis and W ilson paper.
In the large firm studies, the major focus has been upon the conflict 
between managers and shareholders (owners). However, this particular type 
of conflict w ill not normally be important for the majority of small firms 
because of their close company status. Broadly speaking, a close company 
is a company under the control of five or fewer people and their associates, 
which includes close family members (see Burns and Dewhirst [3]). The 
agency problems that arise between stockholders and management are, 
therefore, of reduced importance for close companies since the director/ 
managers are usually the major stockholders. However, there is the 
possibility of conflict arising between the owner/managers and other 
contracting entities such as external lending institutions (banks and venture 
capitalists) and other creditors. Agency theory suggests that debtholders are 
concerned w ith the possibility of wealth transfers to stockholders. Reviewing 
the arguments of Eichenseher and Shields [8 ], Palmrose [18], and Sim unic 
and Stein [20], Francis and W ilson note that if managers are more concerned 
with the interests of stockholders than debtholders, then increases in debt
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contracts should lead to a demand by debtholders for tighter audits. 
Essentially, this argument views the equity of a levered firm as a call option  
(see Black and Scholes [2]) in that increasing levels of debt lead ow ner/ 
managers (of close companies) to take on increasingly risky projects since 
they benefit from the upside risk but bear no more downside risk as debt 
levels increase.
Francis and W ilson, however, contrast w ith this hypothesis concerning 
new debtholders, the hypotheses developed by Healy and Lys [10] and 
Johnson and Lys [12] for existing debt. These authors argue that, since 
managers prefer to take actions that benefit stockholders rather than 
debtholders (especially the case for close companies where owners and 
managers are synonymous) they w ill be motivated to change to more 
accommodating auditors because this w ill allow  value to be switched from 
debtholders to stockholders. T his argument is based on the fact that, while 
existing debt agreements can be monitored, existing debtholders are usually 
not in a position to alter the conditions pertaining to these contracts. Thus, 
unless explicitly prohibited from doing so, owner/m anagers w ill normally 
be able to change their auditor w ithout requiring the agreement of existing  
debtholders. T his argument needs to be conditioned, however, by the 
possibility that the debt may need to be ‘rolled-over’ in the future. T he debt 
bonding perspective adopted in  this paper recognizes that where there is a 
high level of existing debt, the owner/managers may have both strong 
incentives and the ability to change to more ‘accom m odating’ auditors but 
also, when new debt is required, the debtholders are likely to demand less 
‘accommodating’ auditors. Thus owner/managers w ill attempt to engage 
auditors that satisfy  external len d ers’ req u irem en ts w h ile  b e in g  
accommodating to  their own needs.
From this agency perspective of auditing, W illiam s developed the 
follow ing three concepts that help explain how certain events m ight lead 
to auditor change:
(1 ) Changes in  the client’s contracting environment
(2) Auditor competence
(3) Client reputation
We take some of these broad concepts and develop new proxy variables that 
are relevant to auditor change for small firms in the U.K.
(1 ) Change in  Client’s Contracting Environment
The agency perspective of auditing, portrays the demand for auditing  
as arising from the set of contracts that exist w ithin a firm. If the set of
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contracts changes then this could give rise to a change in the demand for 
auditing services. Three operational variables are derived to allow  for changes 
in principal-agent contracts.
Xi =  number of changes in  directors in the two years immediately prior 
to an auditor switch. T his is included because the arrival or departure of 
directors is a major factor in  determining principal-agent contracts w ithin  
close companies.
X 2 =  absolute change in  firm size. W illiams argues that rapid change 
in firm size can be a measure of new principal-agent contracts. Growth or 
decline w ill create new contractual agreements. For instance, owners may 
become sepzirate from managers as growth occurs. In addition, customers 
and suppliers may join /leave the firm as it changes the scale of its operations. 
Of course, client size or growth could also be associated with the employment 
of larger audit firms due to technology or audit efficiency arguments. N o  
attempt is made in  this paper to determine the specific reasons why auditor 
change may be associated w ith client size and/or growth.
X 3 =  absolute change in loans/total assets. T his is designed to capture 
changes in  the involvem ent of external loan capital suppliers in the firm. 
For instance, a firm that greatly increases its reliance on external loan capital 
may be required to engage a new auditor acceptable to the suppliers of the 
new loan(s). Alternatively, a firm that has substantially reduced its reliance 
on loan capital may now  wish to em ploy a different, and possibly cheaper, 
auditor.
(2) Auditor Com petence/Supply
The second concept discussed by W illiams relates to the com petence/ 
effectiveness of the auditor. He argues that principals (for close companies, 
this w ill also include debtholders) would want to change an ineffective 
auditor. However, as is argued below, it is difficult to empirically determine 
directly when an auditor is seen as being ineffective. Accordingly two 
variables are developed that may capture notions of auditor com petence/ 
effectiveness. At the same time it needs to be recognized, however, that these 
variables may be proxying for supply conditions rather than effectiveness.
X 4 =  does the auditor belong to the top 2 0  firms of auditors in  terms 
of fee incom e (see Accountancy [1]) or otherwise. Auditors belonging to the 
top 2 0  auditors may be considered as having reasonably uniform and high  
levels of expertise. In contrast, the set of non-top 20 auditors are likely to
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have a wider range and generally lower levels of expertise as compared to 
the top 20 audit firms. We, therefore, hypothesize, at the m ost general level, 
that changes in the demand for auditor effectiveness are more likely to result 
in a change of auditor if the firm em ploys a non-top 20 audit practice than 
if it employs a top 20 audit firm.
Xs =  firm size in year prior to auditor change. We hypothesize that the 
smaller firm w ill find it easier to change auditors, for whatever reason 
(including disagreements over effectiveness), than larger firms. T his is 
because the smaller firm w ill have a larger potential supply of effective 
auditors than the larger firm. Even the smallest (i.e., one person) audit firm 
is able, and legally permitted, to undertake the auditing tasks of the smallest 
firms. In contrast, when firms demand a more substantial or specialized 
auditing services, then the effective supply dim inishes. For this reason, it is 
rare indeed for the largest (few hundred or so) listed com panies to be audited 
by any audit firm not belonging to the ‘Big-8.’
(3) Client Reputation
The third concept discussed by W illiams is that a firm may seek a change 
of auditor if management perceive that their reputation has been tarnished. 
However, only firms with a substantial degree of external involvement with 
loan creditors and outside (non-director) shareholders, are likely to have a 
strong motive to protect their reputations. Thus, under this heading we 
distinguish three sets of variables relating to audit qualifications (Xe), financial 
condition (X?) and the extent of external interest in the firm (Xg to Xio).
Xe =  receipt of a first time ‘Small Com pany’ audit qualification in the 
year prior to change. A firm may seek to avoid the ‘bad new s’ and costs 
(Crasswell [5]) associated w ith further qualification by changing auditors. 
However, in contrast to the large firm literature on audit qualifications, the 
receipt of the small firm audit qualification is generally viewed as lacking 
in information content because many auditors have a general tendency to 
issue them (see Page [17] and Keasey, Watson and Wynarczyk [14]). 
Nevertheless, we include the receipt of a first time audit qualification as an 
explanatory variable, because previous work by Keasey and Watson [13] into 
financial distress prediction has shown that first time qualifications do 
convey useful information. Other types of qualification are not examined 
(despite the results of Crasswell [5]) because of their comparative rarity.
Xj =  change in earnings/total assets. T his variable is included to capture 
the financial health of the company. As argued by W illiam s, and Schwartz
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and M enon [19], firms with declining financial health are more likely to 
change auditors in an attempt to keep the ‘bad news’ from external parties. 
W hile there is little agreement over which variables capture the health of 
the small firm (see Storey et al. [21] for a discussion of this point), it would  
seem reasonable to expect increasing (decreasing) returns on assets to be 
indicative of general financial health (im pending distress).
Xg =  loans/total assets.
Xg =  secured loan (1 =  yes; 0 =  no).
Xio =  number of non-director shareholders.
These variables are intended to capture the degree of external 
involvem ent/interest in  the company. As argued above, companies with  
proportionately higher loans have a greater incentive to change to more 
accom modating auditors. In contrast, firms w ith loans secured on their 
business assets may be constrained in their choice of auditors and thus are 
less likely to change auditors. T his is because, in order to be assured that 
their investment is being adequately protected, most mortgage agreements 
contain provisions w hich require the agreement of the mortgage holder 
before any change in  auditors can take place. In other words, principals 
cautious enough to secure their loans on tangible assets ensure that the 
m onitoring of the enterprise cannot be adjusted to the benefit of the loan 
recipient. Similarly, firms that have a greater number of shareholders that 
are not involved in  the day-to-day management of the business are also less 
likely to change auditors because of the need to retain the confidence of these 
investors.
DATA, VARIABLES AND EMPIRICAL M ETHODS 
Data
As the data used in  this paper has already been described in  an earlier 
article (see Keasey, W atson and Wynarczyk [14]) it it is only briefly described 
here. In the U.K. there is a statutory requirement for all lim ited liability  
firms, irrespective of size, to lodge their annual audited accounts w ith the 
Registrar of Com panies at Companies House. The authors are not aware 
of a comparable dataset for the U.S. The data used in  this study comes from 
Companies H ouse records and consists of 180 single-plant, independently- 
owned m anufacturing com panies operating in the Northeast of England
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for 1979-1982. W hile some concerns may be expressed over the age and 
regional nature of this data, the authors believe such concerns are largely 
unfounded. Regarding the regional nature of the data, it is difficult to see 
why the situation with respect to auditing w ould be any different for the 
Northeast of England as compared to other areas. In terms of the age of 
the data, it is difficult to see why the environm ents faced by sm all firms 
should have changed so dramatically so as to alter the conclusions of the 
present analysis.
Given the nature of the variables, some of which are computed over a 
two year period, this data set provides sufficient observations for the 
construction of two annual models, each with 180 observations, and one 
‘pooled’ model consisting of 360 observations. For these 360 observations. 
Table 1 gives the frequencies of the types of auditor change that occurred. 
In terms of the arguments presented in the previous section, the empirical 
analysis is restricted to auditor changes where the instigators of change were 
the firms rather than the auditors. In other words, if an auditor put h im / 
herself forward for reappointment in the notes to a set of accounts, then any 
change of auditor in the year following the accounts is assumed to be a result 
of firm actions rather than auditor instigation. Of the 360 observations, 84 
(or 23.3%) had an auditor change for ‘firm’ reasons and 0 at the behest of the 
auditors. W hile this figure for auditor change seems high as compared to the 
figures from existing studies (these generally range from 3-15%; see Crasswell 
[5] for a review), the present sample is concerned with small firms as compared 
to the large firms of previous studies. The large pool of potential auditors 
for the small firm market would suggest, in the first instance, that small firms 
are more likely to change auditors because for the majority there are 
potentially lower search costs. T his argument receives some supf)ort from the 
fact that 69 of the 84 auditor changes were from one small audit firm to another 
sm all aud it firm . In ad d ition  to the a v a ila b ility  o f supply
Table 1 
Auditor Changes
No change 276
Change from Small Audit Firm to Small Audit Firm 69
Change from Small Audit Firm to Large Audit Firm 0
Change from Large Audit Firm to Small Audit Firm 0
Change from Large Audit Firm to Large Audit Firm 15
TOTAL Changes g4
TOTAL Cases jgQ
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argument, it w ould seem reasonable to expect more auditor switching for 
small firms, as compared to large, because of the potentially large changes 
in their growth, profitability, size, etc. (see Storey et al [21]). W hile there is 
no direct support from Table 1 for this hypothesis, in that there is no evidence 
of switching between small and large aucHt firms, it is possible that changing  
auditors w ith in  the two (broadly defined) categories is sufficient to meet the 
needs created by such changes.
In an ideal em pirical setting the auditor switch dependent variable 
w ould be defined/m easured so as to reflect the change in auditor ‘quality’ 
achieved by any switch. Given the nature of the data available for small 
firms, the quality categorization was restricted to top 20 and non-top 20. 
As it turned out there were no switches between these two categories for 
the present sample. T his does not, however, im ply that switches have been 
between equal ‘quality’ auditors. For both the non-top 20 and top 20 sets 
of auditors are likely to have ranges of audit ‘quality.’ However, given the 
local nature of the audit market for small firms and the fact that auditor 
reputations w ill be locally based, it is difficult to see how a robust measure 
of auditor quality could be defined for small firm studies. Accordingly, the 
em pirical analysis of this paper is restricted to a consideration of 
explanations of auditor change w ithout reference to ‘changes in quality’. 
Finally, as a check on the consistency of this approach, the empirical 
analysis was conducted for the overall sample of 84 auditor changes and 
for the 69 auditor changes between small audit firms. As the empirical results 
were essentially the same for both samples, discussion is restricted to the 
overall sam ple results.
Variables
Given the data available from Companies House, and the arguments 
presented in  the previous section, the general model used to determine which  
factors influence the changing of auditors is as follows:
y  =  /(Xi, X2,...Xio)
Where Y  is the dependent variable, coded 1 if a firm switched auditors 
and 0 otherwise. T he defin ition  of the independent variables are detailed  
in  Table 2. T he sam ple was random ly selected from a wide range of 
industries and as the industry dum m y variables were not statistically 
significant w hen included, in  the equations, they are not included in  the 
present analysis.
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Table 2
Independent Variable
Xi is defined as the number of changes in directors over the previous tw^ o years.
X2 is defined as the natural log of the absolute change in total assets over the
previous two years.
X3 absolute change in loans/total assets over the previous two years.
X4 is a dummy variable, coded 1 if the audit firm in the prior year was among
the top 2 0  largest auditing practices and as 0  otherwise.
X5 is defined as the natural log of total assets in the prior year.
Xe is a dummy variable, coded 1 if a first time small company audit qualifica­
tion was received the previous year and 0  otherwise.
X? change in disposable profit/total assets over the previous two years.
Xs total loans/total assets in the previous year.
X9 secured loan, coded 1 if a firm has a secured loan and 0 otherwise.
Xio the total number of non-director shareholders.
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Empirical Methods
Given the nature of the dependent variable, and the existence of 
dichotomous and continuous independent variables, the univariate results 
were derived using chi-square tests and student <-tests where appropriate. In 
terms of the multivariate analysis, the presence of a dichotom ous dependent 
variable and dichotomous independent variables suggests that a form of logit 
analysis is the most suitable multivariate estim ating technique. T he present 
results were derived via the BMDP2 hierairchical stepwise logit package. As 
logit analysis is now a well-established research technique in accounting and 
finance, further description is not given here.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The empirical evidence presented here is based on the full pooled data set 
of 360 observations. The full pooled data set has been employed because the 
empirical results for the two individual years of data were not significandy 
different from one another or from the pooled data set. The bivciriate Pearson 
correlation matrix coefficients (see Appendix) indicate that, w hile some of the 
independent variables £ire significantly correlated with one another, they are 
not of a magnitude which w ould suggest a serious m uldcollinearity problem.
Table 3
Univariate Relationships Between Auditor Changes and the Independent Variables
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SECTION A. Categorial Variables (X4, Xe and X9)
Switched Non-Switched Total X2
X,
Auditor size
Top-20 15 55 70
Non-top-20 69 221 290 0.2
Total 84 276 360
X6
Audit Qualification
Yes 14 27 41
No 70 249 319 3.0*
Total 84 276 360
X,
Secured Loan
Yes 42 183 225
No 42 93 135 7.3***
Total 84 276 360
SECTION B: Continuous Viarables (Xi, X2, X3, X 5, Xi, Xs, Xio)
(Standard deviadons in parentheses)
Switched Non-Switched Total T-value
Xi
Change in directors 2.01 1.47 1.60 2 4***
(1.93) (1.33) (1.51)
X 2
Absolute change in total assets 2.34 2.41 2.39 0.3
(1.63) (2.07) (1.97)
X3
Absolute change in loans
divided by total assets 18.4 15.2 17.7 1.8**
(18.2) (13.2) (17.2)
Xs
log total assets 6.56 6.79 6.74 1.3
(1.38) (1.52) (1.49)
Xi
Change in profits divided by
total assets 0.4 5.2 4.1 1.5
(24.5) (31.2) (29.8)
Xs
loans divided by total assets 35.8 32.5 33.3 1.2
(21.5) (22.7) (22.4)
Xio
Outside Shareholders 0.62 0.72 0.69 0.6
(1.30) (1.53) (1.47)
* Notes: * =  Sig at 10% 
|! ** =  Sig at 5%
U *** =  Sig at 1%
Univariate Results
As can be seen from Section A of Table 3, of the three dichotom ous 
variables considered only the Auditor Size variable (X4) is not significant at 
10% confidence levels. T he secured loan variable (X9) is significant at 1% 
confidence levels and indicates that relatively fewer of the firms that changed 
auditors had loans secured on their assets. T he Sm all Company Audit 
Qualification variable (Xe), though consistent w ith arguments detailed 
earlier, is only just significant at 10%. Section B of the table presents the 
univariate statistics for the continuous variables. W hile the relative 
magnitudes of these variables for firms that changed auditors and those that 
did not are generally in  the expected direction, only the change in directors 
and change in loan variables are statistically significant at 5% confidence 
levels.
Multivariate Results
T he multivariate logistic function results are shown in  Table 4. Section 
A of the table presents the logistic function when all ten independent 
variables are entered directly, w hile Section B presents the hierarchical 
stepwise logit function results where entry is controlled by a statistical 
significance level of 10%. The results for both functions are very similar in 
that the five significant variables in  the full logistic function (Xi , X3, Xe, 
Xs and X9) are also included, and have the same signs and magnitudes, in 
the restricted stepwise function shown in Section B. Discussion is, therefore, 
directed to the stepwise function.
T he significant variables in the stepwise function are all of the ‘correct’ 
sign. The function indicates that firms were sig^nificantiy more likely to 
change their auditors if they
(i) experienced more changes in directors (Xi),
(ii) experienced relatively large changes (positive or negative) in 
their use of loan capital (X3)
(iii) had received a first-time Small Company Audit Qualification 
in their previous set of accounts (Xe),
(iv) had relatively high  levels of loan capital (Xg), and
(v) did not have a loan secured on their business assets (X9).
In terms of an agency perspective, the primary m otivation for changing 
auditors appears to be due to changes in the contracting environment 
(changes in both the ownership and control of the company and changes 
in the use of loan capital), a relatively high reliance upon external debt capital
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Table 4
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Variable
SECTION A: Logistic Function: All Variables Included
Coefficient T-value
Xi 0.245 2.9***
X2 0.061 0.7
Xs 2.112 2.3***
X 4 -0.322 0.9
Xs -0.112 0.9
Xi 0.642 1.7*
Xi -0.498 1.1
Xi 1.291 1.9*
Xs -0.708 2.5***
Xio -0.15 0.2
Constant
Likelihood ratio test =  28.5 with 10 d.f.
Oiow R2 =  0.09
Predictive acccmacy =  79.2%
-0.677 0.8
SECTION B: Stepwise Logistic Function: Probability to Enter O.IO
Variable Coefficient T-value
Xi 0.230 2.8***
X 3 1.827 2.0**
X6 0.666 1.8*
Xg 1.507 2.4**
X, -0.781 3.0***
Constant
Likelihood ratio test =  25.6 with 6 d.f.
Chow =  0.08
Predictive acccuracy =  78.9%
-1.421 4.3***
and the absence of external debtholder constraints as represented by the 
existence of secured loans. Client reputation effects, in  the form of the receipt 
of a first-time qualification are also significant.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In a recent paper, Crasswell [5] noted that auditor switching by large 
Australian firms was related to the receipt of an audit qualification. T his  
result confirmed that of an earlier piece of work by Chow and Rice [4] on  
large U.S. firms. However, it could be argued that both of these studies overly 
concentrated on establishing the significance/non-significance of audit
qualifications for auditor switching, rather than considering a wider set of 
explanatory variables. When W illiam s [22] adopted an agency view of auditor 
switching, he found an auditor industry specialization variable, longevity 
of audit engagement variable and a client negative media publicity variable 
to be significant in explaining why large U.S. firms changed auditors. He 
found no statistical support for the argument that firms change auditors in 
response to receiving an audit qualification.
The results presented in this paper, in  one sense support those of 
W illiams, in that there is positive evidence for a number of the agency 
arguments investigated. The results, however, also contrast w ith those of 
W illiams in that the significance of the receipt of a first-time audit 
qualification variable suggests that some small firms may change auditors 
partly to secure more accommodating monitors. More importantly, in  terms 
of statistical significance, is that the firms investigated here tended to have 
a greater propensity to change auditors if they experienced relatively large 
changes in  their use of external loan capital, if they had relatively high  levels 
of loan capital and if none of these loans were secured. T he results, therefore, 
offer support for the agency arguments investigated and indicate that some 
small firms in  the U.K. may change auditors to obtain more accommodating 
monitors.
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APPENDIX  
Correlation Coefficients
X2 .10
Xs -.14 -.14
X4 .02 .32 .02
Xs .20 .54 .35 .07
X6 .05 .06 .06 .11 .02
Xt .05 -.06 -.17 -.11 .16 -.09
Xg -.16 -.27 .41 -.11 -.41 .05 -.11
X, .01 .14 -.01 0.07 .29 .06 .08 .05
Xio .07 -.03 -.02 -.07 .06 -.10 .03 -.11 .07
AC .15 -.02 -.08 -.02 -.06 .09 -.07 .06 -.1 4 .03
Xi X2 X3 X4 Xs Xe Xj Xs X, X,o
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